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Reconstruction and Resistance 
CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION: POLITICAL FAITH IN AN UNJUST WORLD.  
By Jack M. Balkin.  Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University 
Press, 2011.  304 pages.  $35.00. 
LIVING ORIGINALISM.  By Jack M. Balkin.  Cambridge, Massachusetts: The 
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2011.  480 pages.  $35.00. 
Reviewed by Kermit Roosevelt III* 
Introduction 
Jack Balkin defies categorization.  More precisely, he defies categories.  
His most recent books, Living Originalism1 and Constitutional Redemption,2 
transcend the dichotomies of constitutional theory.  Repeatedly, they show 
that what conventional wisdom views as a strict opposition (originalism 
versus the living constitution, for instance) is in fact not an opposition at all, 
or that a traditional taxonomic dyad (constitutional law and ordinary politics, 
for instance) is incomplete.  His arguments are forceful, elegant, and, I 
believe, generally correct.  Frequently, in fact, they bear the hallmark of truly 
deep insights: they seem obvious in retrospect.  It is possible that these two 
books will mark a real advance in constitutional theory. 
But it is also possible that they will not.  There are reasons that people 
cling to the theories and conceptual structures that Balkin undermines, and 
those reasons are not purely intellectual.  There is a political element to 
constitutional law, of course; there is also a political element to constitutional 
theory.  The presence of political considerations complicates the reception of 
any constitutional theory. 
Politics also complicates the theory itself.  To Balkin’s credit, he 
acknowledges this.  The books spend a substantial amount of time discussing 
how moral and political visions inform constitutional theory and become 
constitutional law.  But they also argue for particular constitutional results, 
and this creates some tension within the enterprise.  It is difficult for a single 
project, even one contained in two books, to employ both an internal and an 
external perspective—to explain how constitutional entrepreneurs succeed in 
making their views law and also to engage in the entrepreneurial venture.  As 
 
 
* Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School.  Thanks to Alisa Melekhina for 
excellent research assistance. 
1. JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM (2011) [hereinafter BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM]. 
2. JACK M. BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION: POLITICAL FAITH IN AN UNJUST WORLD 
(2011) [hereinafter BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION]. 
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when a magician reveals how the trick is done and then performs it, some of 
the conviction is lost. 
The tension between the internal and external perspectives, I believe, is 
not fully resolved within these books.  Balkin’s external perspective, 
historicism, seems to offer scant normative footing for his internal 
arguments, and his account of constitutional change, partisan entrenchment, 
does not make up for this lack.  He turns, then, to the idea of redemption, but 
I will suggest that this is theoretically not fully satisfactory.  Nor, however, is 
it necessary.  Properly understood—understood as Balkin understands it—the 
Constitution itself supplies the magic that seemed to be missing.  In what 
follows, I will try to demonstrate this.  Part I of this review describes the state 
of constitutional theory into which Living Originalism and Constitutional 
Redemption come.  Part II discusses the possibilities they offer, considering 
in particular Balkin’s distinction between the meaning of a constitutional 
provision, which is fixed, and the applications of that meaning, which may 
change over time.  I will offer a slightly different way of thinking about 
which constitutional provisions are intended to have fixed applications (I will 
distinguish between forward-looking and backward-looking provisions, 
rather than rules and principles), but I believe that the distinction is both 
correct and crucially important to constitutional theory.  Part III draws out 
some implications of the distinction for the process of constitutional change.  
I believe that my account here is broadly consistent with Balkin’s views, 
although it also differs in some ways.  I talk about constitutional politics, 
rather than constitutional construction, and I suggest that my version offers 
greater normative purchase.  Part IV takes a more critical turn.  It examines 
the idea of redemption—the stance Balkin suggests we should take towards 
the Constitution.  While I have some reservations about the idea in general, 
my chief concern is that Balkin has chosen the wrong text to redeem. 
I. The Players and the Stakes 
For approximately the past thirty years, conventional wisdom has 
divided constitutional theory into two camps.3  On one side stand the 
originalists, who defend the original understanding of the Constitution and 
insist that constitutional change can come about only through the amendment 
process specified in Article V.4  On the other are the living constitutionalists, 
who believe that the Constitution must be flexible enough to adapt to 
changing times and circumstances even without formal amendment, typically 
through judicial interpretation.5 
 
3. DENNIS J. GOLDFORD, THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION AND THE DEBATE OVER 
ORIGINALISM 24, 55 (2005). 
4. Id. at 55, 138. 
5. Id. at 55. 
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Conventional wisdom also holds that originalists were political 
conservatives and living constitutionalists liberals.6  It is possible to dress up 
the debate in more theoretical terms.  Originalists distrust judges and want to 
bind them, one might say, while living constitutionalists trust them and want 
to empower them.7  Originalists believe judicial decisions about values are 
legitimate if they can be traced back to the framers and ratifiers;8 living 
constitutionalists believe legitimacy comes from current popular opinion.9  
Originalists want to say that constitutional outcomes are not our 
responsibility, while living constitutionalists insist that they are.10 
But as a matter of actual historical fact, the political description, 
reductionist though it may be, is largely correct.  Originalism did not come to 
prominence solely because of theoretical considerations.  Arguments that 
sound in some variant of originalism have, of course, been around since the 
Founding.  Madison, arguing against the First Bank of the United States, 
appealed to the expectations of the ratifiers;11 more notoriously, Chief Justice 
Roger Taney defended his decision in Dred Scott v. Sandford12 in strongly 
originalist terms.13  In recent history, however, originalism received a 
substantial boost from the Reagan Justice Department, and in particular from 
Attorney General Edwin Meese.14  Reagan and Meese were not abstract 
constitutional scholars; they were interested in political results like reining in 
judges and correcting the perceived excesses of the Warren Court.15 
Originalism achieved this result, or at least contributed to it.  In part it 
may have done so by changing minds.  It is possible that there were some 
people, maybe even some judges, who thought about the Constitution 
differently because they had been exposed to originalist arguments.  But 
primarily it achieved its goals by changing personnel. 
 
6. Id. 
7. See id. at 20–24 (discussing the political climate in which originalism became prominent). 
8. Id. at 33–35. 
9. Id. at 59–61. 
10. Though diametrically opposed, these aspirations are both fatal to the success of the 
respective theories, according to Balkin.  A successful constitutional theory, he claims, must allow 
us to see the Constitution as basic law (which creates a stable structure of government), as higher 
law (which embodies values and principles), and as our law (which embodies our values and 
principles).  BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM, supra note 1, at 59–60.  Originalism, with its insistence 
on tracing value choices back to the ratifiers, fails to make the Constitution our law or higher law, 
while living constitutionalism imperils its status as basic law.  Id. at 61–63, 279. 
11. ROBERT A. BURT, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONFLICT 73 (1992). 
12. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857), superseded by constitutional amendment, U.S. CONST. 
amend. XIV. 
13. Austin Allen, An Exaggerated Legacy: Dred Scott and Substantive Due Process, in THE 
DRED SCOTT CASE: HISTORICAL AND CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES ON RACE AND LAW 83, 91–
92 (David Thomas Konig et al. eds., 2010). 
14. Jamal Greene, Selling Originalism, 97 GEO. L.J. 657, 680 (2009). 
15. See id. at 680–81 (explaining that Reagan and Meese wanted to promote democratic self-
government). 
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Liberal academic theory responded to originalism largely by coming up 
with explanations of why judges were justified in doing what they were 
doing.  Judges were good at handling matters of principle, suggested Alex 
Bickel;16 they could aspire to be philosophers, proposed Ronald Dworkin;17 
they could assert themselves when the democratic process was likely to fail, 
said John Hart Ely.18 
Whatever one thinks of these responses, they are directed to judges.  
And while liberals were talking to the judges, telling them to keep on doing 
what they were doing, conservatives were talking to the people.  They were 
warning them of judicial activism, telling them that they were ruled by 
unaccountable elites, and urging them to keep faith with the Founding 
Fathers.19  Originalism helped conservative candidates run against the courts 
in the name of the Constitution.  When these conservatives won, they 
appointed conservative judges.  Naturally, the courts changed course, and 
when in 1997 Ronald Dworkin and a dream team of philosophers set out to 
explain to the Court why the Constitution protected physician-assisted 
suicide,20 it should have surprised no one that the opinion did not dignify 
their amicus brief with so much as a mention.21 
In the academy, originalism did not fare so well.  Various deficiencies 
were pointed out.22  But liberal academic thinking did not coalesce around a 
plausible or easily summarized alternative.  As Justice Scalia argued, “it 
takes a theory to beat a theory,”23 and the result appeared to be largely 
stalemate, sniping, and trench warfare.24 
 
16. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE 
BAR OF POLITICS 23–28 (1962). 
17. RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTION 7–12 (1996) [hereinafter DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW]; see also RONALD 
DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 149 (1978) (calling for “a fusion of constitutional law and 
moral theory” and claiming that philosophy is as much a part of law as sociology and economics). 
18. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 101–04 
(1980). 
19. For a canonical early statement of this view, see RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY 
JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 417 (1977).  For a debased 
descendant, see MARK R. LEVIN, MEN IN BLACK: HOW THE SUPREME COURT IS DESTROYING 
AMERICA 11–12 (2005). 
20. Brief for Ronald Dworkin et al. as Amici Curiae in support of Respondents at 3, 
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997) (Nos. 95-1858, 96-110), 1996 WL 708956. 
21. See generally Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702. 
22. For a brief summary describing the weaknesses of “Old Originalism,” see Thomas B. 
Colby, The Sacrifice of the New Originalism, 99 GEO. L.J. 713, 716–37 (2011). 
23. See James E. Ryan, Laying Claim to the Constitution: The Promise of New Textualism, 97 
VA. L. REV. 1523, 1536 (2011) (citing Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CINN. L. 
REV. 849, 855 (1989)) (characterizing Justice Scalia’s position as “essentially . . . it takes a theory 
to beat a theory”). 
24. As recently as 2009, Jamal Greene commented that “[n]onoriginalists have been on the 
defensive of late.”  Jamal Greene, On the Origins of Originalism, 88 TEXAS L. REV. 1, 86 (2009).  
Originalism faces difficulties too, however.  See generally Mitchell N. Berman, Originalism Is 
Bunk, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (2009) (underlining the fact that originalists disagree amongst 
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II. Text and Principle 
The main theoretical move that Balkin makes is to reject the supposed 
dichotomy between originalism and the living constitution.  He calls them 
“two sides of the same coin,”25 which is perhaps overly charitable.  As 
described, the coin is of no value.  What Balkin actually shows is that they 
are, as conventionally understood, both obviously defective theories that no 
sensible person would hold.  Classic living constitutionalism is silly for all 
the reasons conservatives point out.  The idea that judges must sometimes, 
somehow, “update” the Constitution to keep it in step with the times is 
neither helpful to a judge trying in good faith to discharge her role, nor 
encouraging to a citizen wanting to see himself as a participant in the 
ongoing project of constitutional self-governance. 
Classic originalism is no better, however.  It makes a profound error in 
supposing that fidelity to the original meaning of the Constitution requires 
that cases be decided, to the extent possible, as if they had been brought 
immediately after the ratification of the relevant constitutional provision.26  If 
the courts of 1868 would not have held a particular state practice 
unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment, that is, classic 
originalism holds that a modern court should not do so either.  Constitutional 
provisions, on this view, are designed to fix certain outcomes for all time, or 
at least until amended. 
This view is obviously mistaken because while some constitutional 
provisions might be intended to fix outcomes in that way, others might not.  
Classic originalism fails to distinguish between different types of provisions.  
Balkin’s taxonomy includes rules, standards, principles, and silences.27  
Determinate rules, such as those setting age-based qualifications for office, 
dictate particular results regardless of time and circumstance.28  Standards, 
such as the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on “unreasonable” searches, 
may direct different results as times and circumstances change.29  General 
principles, like the requirement of equal protection, require elaboration (what 
Balkin calls “construction”30) by future generations. 
 
themselves over several aspects of their creed and criticizing originalism (hard and soft) as being 
based on faulty logic and ultimately impractical). 
25. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM, supra note 1, at 20. 
26. See GOLDFORD, supra note 3, at 9 (“[O]riginalism at its simplest holds that a constitutional 
provision means precisely what it meant to the generation that wrote and ratified it, and not, as 
nonoriginalism would contend, what it might mean differently to any subsequent generation.”). 
27. BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION, supra note 2, at 229. 
28. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM, supra note 1, at 6. 
29. See id. at 6–7 (“Adopters use fixed rules because they want to limit discretion; they use 
standards or principles because they want to channel politics through certain key concepts but 
delegate the details to future generations.”). 
30. See id. at 44 (“[V]ague and abstract clauses [such as ‘equal protection of the laws’] will 
likely reflect contemporary understandings rather than original understandings.”). 
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One might also describe this taxonomy in a slightly different way, 
focusing on the purpose of the constitutional provision.  Some provisions, 
like the age requirements31 and the division of Congress into House and 
Senate,32 are structural.  They create the institutions of government and the 
means by which ordinary politics will be conducted.  Absent a strong 
indication to the contrary, it is reasonable to expect that these provisions are 
intended to be dead, as Justice Scalia puts it when being puckish, or 
enduring, as he puts it when not.33  Other provisions are what Richard Primus 
calls “concrete negation[s],”34 designed to take off the table certain policies 
and practices which have been judged categorically undesirable.  These 
provisions—such as the Third Amendment’s ban on peacetime quartering of 
troops in houses35 or the Thirteenth Amendment’s ban on slavery36—are 
backward looking.  They focus on a well-defined practice and say “never 
again.”37  Many of these are rights provisions, but not all—one could also 
point to the creation of life tenure for federal judges and the prohibition of 
salary reductions as concrete negations of practices complained of in the 
Declaration of Independence, namely King George’s making “Judges 
dependent on his Will alone, for the tenure of their offices, and the amount 
and payment of their salaries.”38  Backward-looking provisions, like 
structural ones, should ordinarily be understood to have a fixed and 
determinate set of applications. 
Forward-looking provisions are different.  A forward-looking provision 
has a fixed meaning: it might require states to avoid invidious discrimination, 
as our Equal Protection Clause essentially does,39 or it might (to use an 
imaginary example) require Senators to wear the latest fashions while 
engaged in debate.40  But it does not contemplate a static range of 
 
31. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2 (“No Person shall be a Representative who shall not 
have attained to the Age of twenty five Years . . . .”). 
32. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1. 
33. Antonin Scalia, Assoc. Justice, Supreme Court of the U.S., Wriston Lecture at the 
Manhattan Institute for Policy Research: On Interpreting the Constitution (Nov. 17, 1997), available 
at http://www.manhattan-institute.org/html/wl1997.htm (“Come along with me and admire the 
Dead Constitution.  I have to get a new term for it . . .  [M]aybe the Enduring Constitution.  That’s a 
little better.”). 
34. RICHARD A. PRIMUS, THE AMERICAN LANGUAGE OF RIGHTS 7 (1999). 
35. U.S. CONST. amend. III. 
36. Id. amend. XIII, § 1. 
37. They could just say “never,” but typically such provisions arise from experience with the 
prohibited practice.  The suggested federal marriage amendment, S.J. Res. 1, 109th Cong. (2005), 
which would have preemptively banned same-sex marriage, is a notable counterexample.  But 
perhaps precisely because there was no experience to demonstrate the evils of same-sex marriage, 
the amendment failed to gain traction.  See Carl Hulse, Senate Rebuffs Same-Sex Marriage Ban, 
N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/06/08/washington/08cong.html 
(explaining the Senate vote striking down the bill). 
38. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). 
39. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
40. KERMIT ROOSEVELT III, THE MYTH OF JUDICIAL ACTIVISM: MAKING SENSE OF SUPREME 
COURT DECISIONS 51 (2006). 
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applications.  Conduct that might have complied with its requirement at one 
point (racially segregating public schools in 1868, say, or wearing a 
powdered wig in 1789) will violate that requirement later. 
It is reasonable to debate whether particular constitutional provisions 
are forward looking or backward looking.  It is not reasonable to deny the 
possibility of a forward-looking provision, which classic originalism seems 
to do, at least implicitly.  To make an explicit argument, one might claim that 
constitution drafters are very unlikely to write forward-looking provisions.  
Justice Scalia has suggested as much, arguing that the whole point of a 
constitution is to prevent backsliding—to ensure a set of minimum standards 
that the future must respect.41 
But that is not the whole point of a constitution, as Balkin notes.42  That 
is the point of a backward-looking provision.  The point of a forward-looking 
provision is not to remove or require certain identified practices; it is to 
delegate the application of a principle to future generations.43  Drafters might 
do this for several reasons.  They might hope that future generations will be 
similar to them, while knowing that future circumstances will change, so that 
a delegation is the best way of achieving the outcomes they would have 
desired had they been able to predict the future.  (I would guess that the 
Fourth Amendment reasonableness requirement44 was supposed to work this 
way.)  Drafters might anticipate that future generations will be different and 
intend to let the future’s views prevail within the framework they have set 
out.  (This would be the purpose of my fictitious “latest fashions” clause; it 
might also be the purpose of the Equal Protection Clause.)  Or they might be 
aiming to promote national unity and uniformity, rather than particular 
substantive values.  At the Founding, they might want to constrain the 
practices of the federal government by reference to those of the states, 
prohibiting the federal government from imposing punishments that most 
states rejected as too cruel.  (This is the evolving view of the Cruel and 
Unusual Punishment Clause.45)  After the Civil War, they might have wanted 
to use national opinion as to the fairness of certain kinds of discrimination to 
 
41. Antonin Scalia, Response, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE 
LAW 129, 145 (1997); see also, John O. McGinnis & Michael Rappaport, Original Interpretive 
Principles as the Core of Originalism, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 371, 372 (2007) (offering the theory 
that constitution drafters are risk averse and would therefore avoid delegations).  The logic behind 
this is not clear to me. 
42. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM, supra note 1, at 28–29. 
43. As Balkin puts it, the Constitution is intended also to “channel and discipline future 
political judgment.”  Id. at 29. 
44. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
45. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (“The [Eighth] Amendment must draw its 
meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society”); see 
also Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 561 (2005) (affirming the necessity of referring to society’s 
“evolving standards of decency” when determining which punishments are so disproportionate as to 
be cruel and unusual). 
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rein in outlier states.  (This seems a reasonable purpose for the Equal 
Protection Clause and is historically the role it has played.46) 
In short, the idea of a forward-looking provision cannot be dismissed 
out of hand.  It is plausible that this is how some of our constitutional 
provisions are designed to function; it is undeniable that it is how some have 
functioned.  In fact, there is a reasonable argument that enforcing the will of 
a national majority against outlier states is what the Supreme Court does best.  
Its race equality cases such as Brown v. Board of Education47 and Loving v. 
Virginia48 fit this pattern and have been relatively unqualified successes.  
They are accepted by the legal community and the public to such an extent 
that constitutional theories are deemed failures and Supreme Court nominees 
rejected if they suggest those cases are wrongly decided.  When the Court 
takes on states without the support of a national majority and the federal 
government, it produces decisions more like Lochner v. New York49 and Roe 
v. Wade.50  These decisions, particularly Roe, have their supporters, but for 
substantial segments of the legal community they serve as the opposite kind 
of litmus test: nominees and theories must reject them.  Last, when the Court 
takes on the other branches of the federal government, its results are mixed at 
best.  A case like Boumediene v. Bush51 is a good example: the Court 
announced grand principles, but in the face of opposition from the political 
branches (and a notable lack of enthusiasm from the D.C. Circuit) the 
practical significance has been very slight.52 
Thus, the distinction between original meaning and original expected 
application makes obvious theoretical sense and is also a good fit with our 
actual constitutional practice.  It allows for a reconciliation of sorts between 
 
46. See Kermit Roosevelt III, Interpretation and Construction: Originalism and Its Discontents, 
34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 99, 102–03 (2011) (arguing that courts have used the Equal Protection 
Clause to end discrimination that was supported by only a minority of states). 
47. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
48. 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
49. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
50. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).  On pushback from the states and negative popular reaction to these 
two cases, see BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE 175–77, 298–99 (2009). 
51. 553 U.S. 723 (2008). 
52. See generally Stephen I. Vladeck, The D.C. Circuit After Boumediene, 41 SETON HALL L. 
REV. 1451 (2011) (outlining the D.C. Circuit’s efforts to limit the effect of Boumediene).  One 
might also look for examples to the World War II cases about the rights of Japanese Americans.  
E.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); Ex parte Mitsuye Endo, 323 U.S. 283 
(1944); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943).  In these cases, the Court offered no real 
resistance to federal mistreatment of a vulnerable group, though it did at least try to articulate the 
principle that detention required individualized proof of disloyalty.  See Patrick O. Gudridge, 
Remember Endo?, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1933, 1951–52 (2003) (indicating the Court’s discomfort 
with detention when it has no relationship to the loyalty of Japanese Americans or the war effort).  
Less charitably, one might point to the cases in which the Supreme Court sought to hold back the 
New Deal, cases like United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936) and A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. 
v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).  There the Court gave ground and backed down in later 
decisions such as United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941) and NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel 
Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937). 
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originalism and the living constitution; there is one dichotomy transcended.  
It also, we shall see, allows for a different understanding of the relation of 
social and political movements to the Constitution. 
III. Constitutional Politics, Constitutional Change 
The conventional view of the relation between the Constitution and 
ordinary politics is that the two together exhaust the field.  Some issues the 
Constitution decides; the rest are left up to the political process.53  But like 
the dichotomy between originalism and the living constitution, this is a false 
choice: there is a third way. 
The third possibility is what we could call constitutional politics.  (It is 
roughly what I think Balkin has in mind by “constitutional construction,”54 
though I do not claim that my exposition here tracks his precisely.)  
Constitutional politics determines how courts apply forward-looking 
provisions. 
Suppose for the moment that the Equal Protection Clause is such a 
provision.  It prohibits, let us say, unjustified or oppressive discrimination, of 
the sort the Court has sometimes called “invidious.”55  An individual comes 
to court complaining that a state has engaged in such discrimination by, for 
instance, prohibiting interracial marriages or excluding women from the 
practice of law.  How should the court decide whether this claim is sound? 
Classic originalism would tell us to look at what the drafters and 
ratifiers of the Equal Protection Clause would have said, and the historical 
evidence is relatively clear that they would have viewed these state law 
classifications as acceptable.56  Living constitutionalism, in its 
undertheorized form, would have judges somehow decide on their own, 
based perhaps on their best philosophical understanding of the idea of 
equality.57  But neither of these approaches, according to the account I have 
developed, is the correct way to apply a forward-looking provision.  Instead, 
courts should look to national sentiment, ideally as reflected in objective 
 
53. See Jack M. Balkin, Framework Originalism and the Living Constitution, 103 NW. U. L. 
REV. 549, 557 (2009) (describing the view that “absent the use of the amendment process . . . 
political decisions do not add anything significant to the constitutional plan [but] occur as 
permissible activity within the plan”). 
54. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM, supra note 1, at 5 (explaining Balkin’s definition of the 
term “constitutional construction”). 
55. E.g., Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 71 (1968); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 8 (1967); 
Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955). 
56. See BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM, supra note 1, at 8 (arguing that applying the original 
expected application of the Constitution would be “inconsistent with constitutional guarantees of 
sex equality for married women, with constitutional protection of interracial marriage, with the 
constitutional right to use contraceptives, and with the modern scope of free-speech rights under the 
First Amendment” (footnotes omitted)). 
57. Id. at 278. 
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indicia such as state laws and state court decisions, to guide their application 
of the federal constitutional principle.58 
If the Equal Protection Clause is a forward-looking provision, then, 
there is a correct answer to the question whether some form of discrimination 
is unconstitutional.  But the answer depends on what the nation thinks is 
invidious discrimination and what it thinks is reasonable.  The correct 
outcome is not determined by the Framers, as classic originalism would have 
it, nor by judges, as living constitutionalism suggests.  Instead, it is 
determined by social movements and political mobilizations.  Forces such as 
the civil rights and feminist movements change society’s views about the 
appropriate treatment of blacks and women, and in so doing they change the 
requirements of the Constitution—though not its meaning. 
Forward-looking provisions thus give us one explanation for how 
constitutional outcomes can change, how a practice that was accepted at the 
ratification of the Equal Protection Clause can be unconstitutional some 
years later without an intervening amendment.  The operation of 
constitutional politics makes arguments that seem “merely” political or 
moral—arguments about fairness and hierarchy—of constitutional stature. 
Another explanation, which is related, is that it may be that what has 
changed is not the constitutional requirement but the judicially created 
doctrine that implements it.  Courts may start out thinking that they should be 
very deferential to legislatures with respect to the question of whether some 
state act is consistent with a constitutional principle, but later become more 
suspicious or the reverse.  This shift in the level of deference gives a fairly 
straightforward explanation of whether, and how, Plessy and Lochner were 
wrong when decided, the subject of one chapter of Constitutional 
Redemption.59 
The answer is that both Plessy and Lochner were correct in their 
exposition of constitutional principles, at least in the sense that we still 
adhere to similar views.  Plessy explained that the Equal Protection Clause 
prohibited classifications designed “for the annoyance or oppression of a 
particular class,”60 and the Lochner Court understood the Due Process Clause 
to require that state laws promote the public interest.61  We still hold those 
principles.  What has changed since Plessy and Lochner is not the Court’s 
 
58. Again, this is a description that fits the practice of the Supreme Court.  Loving, for instance, 
followed a pattern of judicial and legislative actions striking down antimiscegenation laws at the 
state level: In the fifteen years preceding Loving, fourteen states had repealed their 
antimiscegenation laws through legislative action.  Loving, 388 U.S. at 6 n.5.  And in 1948, 
California’s Supreme Court held that the state’s antimiscegenation statute was unconstitutional in 
the case Perez v. Lippold, 198 P.2d 17 (Cal. 1948). 
59. BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION, supra note 2, at ch. 7. 
60. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 550 (1896). 
61. See Kermit Roosevelt III, Forget the Fundamentals: Fixing Substantive Due Process, 8 U. 
PA. J. CONST. L. 983, 986–87 (2006) (stating that one theme of substantive due process 
jurisprudence was that government action must serve a public purpose). 
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reading of the Constitution’s principles, but rather its view about how 
deferential it should be to state legislatures in deciding whether laws are 
consistent with them.  The Plessy Court was very deferential, but a modern 
Court would be highly suspicious of a racial classification.  The Lochner 
Court was not deferential for it believed it had bright-line rules that would let 
judges draw the required boundaries.62  A modern court would declare itself 
incapable of second-guessing legislative assessments: “[W]hen the 
legislature has spoken, the public interest has been declared in terms well-
nigh conclusive.”63 
Once we distinguish between underlying principles and implementing 
doctrine, the question of correctness looks a bit different.  As far as the level 
of deference is concerned, there is no clear standard by which to call a 
decision right or wrong.  We can, however, ask whether there is a good 
explanation for the choice of a particular level.  On that question, Plessy’s 
choice to defer seems extremely dubious.  The Louisiana legislature in the 
1890s should not have been given a great deal of latitude to weigh the 
interests of its black citizens against those of its whites; it was predictable 
that it would make bad decisions.64  Lochner’s refusal to defer is a bit more 
defensible; in the intellectual environment in which the Court operated, it 
believed it had tools that allowed it to patrol the boundaries of the public 
interest.65  When those tools broke, under the influence of Legal Realism and 
the Great Depression, the Court appropriately backed down.66 
Balkin does not explicitly discuss the role of shifting doctrine, but it is 
related to what I have called constitutional politics in that changed views 
about what is reasonable often drive changes in the level of deference.  If 
certain kinds of discrimination are generally viewed as reasonable, courts 
tend to evaluate challenges to them deferentially; if they are generally viewed 
 
62. See id. at 991 (explaining that Lochner-era judicial review came to be seen as illegitimate 
when the categorical lines the Court sought to create broke down). 
63. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954). 
64. See THOMAS J. DAVIS, PLESSY V. FERGUSON: LANDMARKS OF THE AMERICAN MOSAIC 
135 (2012) (stating that white Democrats had captured most of Louisiana’s state legislature by the 
late 1870s, allowing them to adopt a new state constitution that shifted away from equal rights, 
eliminated bans on racially segregated schools, and added an annual poll tax that was onerous on 
blacks and Creoles). 
65. See Jack M. Balkin, “Wrong the Day It Was Decided”: Lochner and Constitutional 
Historicism, 85 B.U. L. REV. 677, 687–88 (2005) (claiming that the jurisprudence of the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries “represented a fairly sophisticated police power theory of 
limited government” and reflected the idea that “the [Fourteenth] Amendment was designed to 
prevent so-called ‘class legislation’ that favored one group over another”); David E. Bernstein, 
Lochner Era Revisionism, Revised: Lochner and the Origins of Fundamental Rights 
Constitutionalism, 92 GEO. L.J. 1, 45–46 (2003) (suggesting that the Court saw the Fourteenth 
Amendment as preserving the common law and natural rights tradition which limited freedom for 
the social good). 
66. Bernstein, supra note 65, at 50–51 (claiming that the Court’s commitment to established 
constitutional limitations on government, along with its libertarian views and Lochnerian 
jurisprudence, were weakened through legal realism and the Great Depression). 
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as invidious, courts are more likely to use heightened scrutiny.  And changes 
in doctrine and constitutional politics alike fit within what Balkin describes 
as historicism, the view that “the conventions determining what is a good or 
bad legal argument about the Constitution, what is a plausible legal claim, 
and what is ‘off-the-wall’ change over time in response to changing social, 
political, and historical conditions.”67 
Historicism as Balkin describes it is consistent with the idea that the 
meaning of the Constitution changes, and he sometimes seems to suggest that 
this happens, at least with respect to the meaning of the constructed 
Constitution.68  I prefer to draw the lines somewhat differently; I believe it is 
sensible to say that meaning remains fixed, while both applications of 
forward-looking provisions and implementing doctrine may change.  But 
whether you consider Balkin’s theory exactly as presented in the book, or 
with the slight modifications I have suggested here, it is substantially 
superior to both classic originalism and classic living constitutionalism.  It 
offers a vision of constitutional practice that fits with our actual history and 
explains why originalists can view departures from original expected 
applications, like Brown or Loving, not as errors to be cabined but as correct 
as a matter of constitutional law.  I think it is correct, and, like Balkin, I 
consider myself an originalist.69 
IV. Beyond Redemption 
So where does this leave us?  What happens when everyone accepts 
Balkin’s theory of text and principle, as they should?  Having discussed the 
argument of Living Originalism, I turn now to Constitutional Redemption.  
(Balkin suggests the books be read in the opposite order, but I disagree, as I 
will explain below.) 
It leaves us, Balkin suggests, with an attitude towards the Constitution 
that can best be described in terms of faith and redemption.70  The 
Constitution is imperfect.  Not just because something better could be 
imagined; the Constitution is imperfect on its own terms.71  It fails to live up 
to its promises.  It is fallen. 
 
67. Balkin, supra note 65, at 679. 
68. He suggests, for instance, that if we do not agree that Lochner was wrong when decided, we 
must explain how the Constitution changed.  See id. at 696–98.  I disagree; as the text explains, I 
think it is easy to see, according to Balkin’s own theory, how outcomes change while the 
Constitution does not. 
69. But see Tara Smith, Originalism’s Misplaced Fidelity: “Original” Meaning Is Not 
Objective, 26 CONST. COMMENT. 1, 5 n.21 (2009) (disagreeing with Balkin’s characterization of me 
as an originalist).  More precisely, I am an originalist with respect to the meaning of the 
Constitution.  How a judge should decide a case is a different question. 
70. See BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION, supra note 2, at 2, 5 (arguing that “[t]he 
legitimacy of our Constitution depends . . . on our faith in the constitutional project” and that we 
should embrace a redemptive narrative of our Constitution). 
71. See id. at 249 (“The Constitution, and therefore the Constitution-in-practice, always exists 
in a fallen condition.”). 
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But it may be redeemed.  Through the processes of constitutional 
change described above, it might better fulfill its promises.72  It will never do 
so perfectly—it will always be fallen, always in need of redemption.73  But 
we may hope that we will leave it better than we found it.  We may—we 
must—have faith that our faith is not in vain. 
This is a nice vision.  It fits in well with the American mythology that 
we are a people always striving to realize the promise of America.74  And it 
puts the best possible gloss on the fact that people have different views of 
that promise.  That is why the Constitution is always fallen—there will 
always be people who disagree as to how forward-looking provisions should 
be applied.75  Balkin’s idea of redemption explains how people can think the 
Constitution should mean different things but still all believe in the same 
Constitution—it explains how the Constitution can play a centralizing and 
legitimating role in American political discourse, why different movements 
all make their claims in the terms of the Constitution, and why the 
Constitution is not just a monument to past struggles but a battleground for 
present ones.76 
Yet I think Balkin’s argument is mistaken in some fundamental ways.  
This is not the vision of constitutional practice that people are likely to have 
or in fact should. 
First, what will happen in practice?  It seems quite likely that some 
originalists will, at least for a while, continue to try to defend the position 
that fidelity to the Constitution requires consistency with original expected 
applications—that is, they will continue to refuse to acknowledge forward-
looking propositions.  It seems likely because the point about the distinction 
between meaning and application has been made before, yet classic 
originalism persists.  In the academic context, the distinction has perhaps 
gained currency: Mitch Berman claims that all serious originalists accept it.77  
And though that may be an overstatement, even Justice Scalia has 
acknowledged the point in his extrajudicial writings.78 
When acting as a judge, however, Scalia consistently ignores the 
possibility, arguing to the contrary that a practice accepted at the time a 
 
72. See id. at 27 (arguing that his account of the Constitution is the “story about the eventual 
fulfillment of promises made long ago”). 
73. See id. at 249 (“[The Constitution] is an unfinished building, and perpetually in need of 
repair and renovation.”). 
74. See Daniel Bell, “American Exceptionalism” Revisited: The Role of Civil Society, PUB. 
INT., Spring 1989, at 38, 46 (describing the conviction that America was to be dedicated to the 
liberty and dignity of the individual in realizing a better world and characterizing the American 
Revolution as having left the people in control of their social order). 
75. See BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION, supra note 2, at 10 (“People disagree with 
each other about the best way to go forward, and the best way to redeem the Constitution.”). 
76. See id. (describing the ways that Americans disagree over the proper interpretation of the 
Constitution and noting that “[w]e do not know whose version of the Constitution will prevail”). 
77. Berman, supra note 24, at 28. 
78. Scalia, supra note 41, at 144–45. 
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particular constitutional provision was ratified cannot subsequently become 
unconstitutional by reason of changed societal attitudes.79  Why his practice 
is inconsistent with his more academic writings is not clear, but it is hard to 
avoid suspecting that he clings to original expected applications because 
classic originalism was developed and marketed precisely in order to 
promote those applications and delegitimize the contrary Warren Court 
decisions.80  Originalism cannot assimilate Balkin’s insights and still do the 
political work its early proponents hoped for. 
So political factors may prevent people from accepting the distinction 
between meaning and application that Balkin proposes.  There may be 
psychological factors at work as well.  Classic originalism, at least as 
practiced by Scalia, allows its wielder to avoid responsibility for hard 
decisions (all the value choices were made by the ratifiers) and to accuse 
anyone who disagrees of willful infidelity to the Constitution.81  That is an 
easier worldview to have than one in which judges are required to pay 
attention to the current sociopolitical climate and try to implement fixed 
principles in changing circumstances. 
But even if people were to accept the distinction, as I do, I do not think 
that the attitude of faith in redemption that Balkin describes is the proper 
consequence.  One problem is that the idea of redemption makes sense 
primarily with respect to the application of forward-looking provisions.  If I 
think the Constitution is defective because of its structural provisions—
giving equal Senate representation to California and Wyoming, for instance, 
or the operation of the electoral college—redemption through construction 
will not do much for me.  Ditto if I think that the structure, while perhaps 
adequate as conceived, fails when political parties enter the picture.82 
Even with respect to the forward-looking provisions, though, I am 
disinclined to accept the image of a fallen Constitution in need of 
redemption.  Something is fallen because it has fallen, and it must have fallen 
from somewhere.  Balkin’s account seems to require a prelapsarian moment, 
a constitutional Eden.  But that never existed.  Nor is it entirely sensible to 
regard the Constitution as fallen just because the Court’s interpretation of a 
 
79. Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62, 95 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
80. See Greene, supra note 14, at 679–82 (discussing the early promotion of originalism and its 
goal of popularizing judicial restraint as a way of undermining the criminal procedure, First 
Amendment, and substantive due process decisions of the Warren Court). 
81. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 567 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(accusing “this most illiberal Court” of “writ[ing] into the Constitution” the “smug assurances of 
[the] age”). 
82. For instance, political parties play havoc with the Framers’ notion of separation of powers.  
The Framers envisioned government officials feeling institutional loyalty to their offices, so that 
each branch would naturally act to protect its power and restrain the others.  But party loyalty 
clearly trumps institutional loyalty, so that a Congress controlled by the President’s party may not 
check him much, and one controlled by the opposition party may try to make him fail rather than 
cooperate in governance.  Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not 
Powers, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2312, 2312–16 (2006). 
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forward-looking provision does not embody my views.  If I lose out in this 
argument—perhaps I believe that the Equal Protection Clause guarantees 
same-sex marriage, but the Court disagrees—the Constitution has not failed 
to live up to its promise.  According to the account of constitutional change 
developed above, the Constitution surely could have accommodated my 
vision.  (It contains multitudes.)  The failure lies with the Court and the 
American people; they are the ones who have not accepted it.  And perhaps 
that should not be counted a failure.  In constitutional politics, like ordinary 
politics, there are winners and losers, by design.  If I believe that the point of 
the Equal Protection Clause is to enforce the will of a national majority,83 I 
can hardly complain just because the majority does not share my views. 
Just as failure to prevail with respect to the application of a forward-
looking provision does not mean the Constitution is fallen, success does not 
mean it is redeemed.  To say that a particular decision (take Loving as an 
example) redeems the promise of the Equal Protection Clause suggests that 
Loving was somehow present in the drafting or ratifying.84  But it seems very 
unlikely that many of the drafters or ratifiers believed that the Clause would 
require states to permit interracial marriages.85  Those who did were outliers 
and extremists.  To suggest that their views are and were the true meaning of 
the Clause makes it into a Trojan Horse, whose real contents were hidden 
from the ratifiers until judges, like Sinon, released them on an unsuspecting 
nation.86  This is one view of constitutional change—it seems to be Ronald 
Dworkin’s, for instance87—but it does not sound to me like legitimate 
change. 
Nor is it actually consistent with the theory behind forward-looking 
provisions.  The point of a delegation, as I have described it, is not that the 
drafters and ratifiers had secret hopes about the true meaning of the 
principles they enacted that might someday be realized, nor that they enacted 
a principle about whose content they were ignorant, awaiting explanation 
from philosopher–judges.  It is that they actually wanted the future to decide.  
The ratifiers agreed that equality was important, and they deserve credit for 
that.88  But Loving is the work of the Warren Court and the political and 
 
83. Roosevelt, supra note 46, at 102–04. 
84. I have some difficulty making out Balkin’s view on this point.  He persistently denies that 
redemption means “the unfolding of preordained events, or returning to a determinate path already 
marked out.”  BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM, supra note 1, at 76.  But if not, why call it redemption 
rather than simply delegation? 
85. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM, supra note 1, at 183. 
86. VIRGIL, THE AENEID 30–31 (Ernest Rhys ed., E. Fairfax Taylor trans., E.P. Dutton & Co. 
1907). 
87. DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW, supra note 17, at 7–12. 
88. See generally Steven G. Calabresi & Julia T. Rickert, Originalism and Sex Discrimination, 
90 TEXAS L. REV. 1 (2011) (arguing in favor of an anticaste original public meaning of the 
Fourteenth Amendment). 
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social movements that made that decision possible.89  It is not the work of the 
Reconstruction Congress or the ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment.90  
Classic originalists, I have said, seem to want to attribute all constitutional 
outcomes to the ratifiers, while living constitutionalists want to give 
responsibility to the present.  Redemption seems to transcend this dichotomy 
as well, imagining an intemporal partnership, but it gives too much credit to 
the past and too little to the present. 
If the idea of redemption has as many problems as I suggest, why does 
Balkin introduce it?  I suspect it is for the reason that social movements, as 
Balkin notes, frequently cast their arguments as redemptive: enlisting the 
authority of the Framers gives greater normative purchase. 
Normative purchase is something that Living Originalism struggles 
with.91  The book does two very different things.  It describes how 
constitutional law is practiced, and it argues for particular understandings of 
provisions such as the Commerce Clause92 and Section Five of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.93  The arguments are not presented just as models of 
constitutional construction; they are meant to persuade.  But since Balkin 
simultaneously tells us that many different constructions are possible,94 it 
 
89. See Michael J. Klarman, Rethinking the Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Revolutions, 82 VA. 
L. REV. 1, 7–18 (1996) (discussing the political history underlying Warren Court jurisprudence). 
90. Perhaps especially not the ratifiers, given the coercion involved in obtaining ratification.  As 
Michael W. McConnell has explained: 
The state ratification debates did not dwell on the details of the proposed Amendment, 
and—an important point—the margin of victory for the Amendment was attained by 
coercion of the Southern states rather than by winning the support of the electorate in 
three-fourths of the States.  When an Amendment obtains its supermajority through 
congressional exercise of its power to condition readmission of states to the Union, it is 
a fiction to treat the opinions of the people of the various states as controlling; it is 
Congress that effectively exercised the amendatory power. 
Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 VA. L. REV. 947, 1109 
(1995). 
 The fact that the Reconstruction Amendments were forced on an unwilling South explains why 
they have had such an unusual career, with an early eclipse as Reconstruction was abandoned and 
then a return in what has been called the Second Reconstruction.  For the forced nature of the 
Reconstruction Amendments, see id.  For a discussion of the demise of the era of Reconstruction 
with the rise of white supremacy, see ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED 
REVOLUTION 1863–1877, at 585–87 (1988).  For the Second Reconstruction, see C. VANN 
WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW 6–10, 122–47 (3d rev. ed. 2002).  The Civil 
War and its aftermath make the American constitutional experience quite unusual, which is one 
reason it might not hold many lessons for other countries.  Our federalist structure is another.  Given 
that the Supreme Court’s great successes came in imposing the national will on outlier states, it may 
not be reasonable to expect other countries’ high courts to achieve similar successes if they do not 
have a similar federal structure with regional variance. 
91. Indeed, at the end of Constitutional Redemption Balkin tells us that he became an originalist 
because he wanted greater normativity.  See BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION, supra note 2, 
at 247–50. 
92. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
93. Id. amend. XIV, § 5. 
94. See, e.g., BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION, supra note 2, at 39 (“[R]easonable 
people disagree, and often quite strongly, about the best interpretation of the Constitution, how to 
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becomes harder to be forceful about the correctness of these ones.  (It is, as I 
said, like a magician who explains the trick and then performs it, and it is 
perhaps in order to place the performance before the explanation that Balkin 
suggests that Constitutional Redemption be considered a prequel to Living 
Originalism.95) 
To put the point generally, Balkin’s historicism saps normativity.  He is 
not a relativist—he rejects explicitly the idea that every dominant opinion is 
correct relative to its time—but he does not have much in the way of a 
transtemporal criterion of correctness.  His theory of constitutional change, 
partisan entrenchment, is almost entirely nonnormative: win elections, put in 
your judges, and the Constitution will reflect your views.96  He argues that 
his constructions are superior according to the traditional modalities of 
constitutional argument—text, structure, history, prudence, and so on—but 
this is not a particularly inspiring set of criteria. 
It is not as inspiring, certainly, as the idea of keeping faith with the 
Founders and redeeming the fallen Constitution.  None of Balkin’s doctrinal 
arguments packs the emotional punch of his story about how all of American 
constitutional history is the struggle to fulfill the promise of the Declaration 
of Independence.97  The idea of redemption allows Balkin to give his 
arguments a moral dimension, to sound more like someone struggling over 
constitutional meaning at the ground level than an observer hovering above 
the fray.98 
 
apply it to new situations going forward, and whether to rethink old constructions in light of 
changed circumstances.”). 
95. Id. at 289. 
96. Id. at 201; Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Processes of Constitutional Change: 
From Partisan Entrenchment to the National Surveillance State, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 489, 490 
(2006); Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Understanding the Constitutional Revolution, 87 VA. 
L. REV. 1045, 1066–83 (2001) [hereinafter Balkin & Levinson, Understanding the Constitutional 
Revolution].  As I tell my students, in the long run, we get the Constitution we deserve. 
97. BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION, supra note 2, at ch. 2. 
98. Balkin is certainly not above the fray.  He has his own views, which he argues for in Living 
Originalism.  He participated in the litigation over the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 
(ACA), filing a brief arguing that the act could be supported as an exercise of the taxing power.  
Brief of Constitutional Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners (Minimum 
Coverage Provision), Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, No. 11-393 (Jan. 13, 2012), 2012 WL 
135050.  But even in these contexts, his historicism gives him a different perspective.  The Supreme 
Court’s acceptance of the arguments against the ACA as Commerce Clause legislation, in Balkin’s 
view, is a success for constitutional entrepreneurs such as Randy Barnett.  It is an example of how 
political movements and political parties can change the terms of constitutional debate, and though 
it happened surprisingly quickly, it is not different in kind from the way in which arguments in 
favor of constitutional protection for same-sex marriage gained acceptance.  Jack M. Balkin, From 
Off the Wall to On the Wall: How the Mandate Challenge Went Mainstream, ATLANTIC (June 4, 
2012, 2:55 PM), http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2012/06/from-off-the-wall-to-on-the-
wall-how-the-mandate-challenge-went-mainstream/258040/.  Other constitutional law professors, 
by contrast, view the Court’s acceptance as an abandonment of legal principle.  See, e.g., Ezra 
Klein, Of Course the Supreme Court Is Political, EZRA KLEIN’S WONKBLOG, WASH. POST 
(June 21, 2012, 12:42 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/ezra-klein/wp/2012/06/21/of-
course-the-supreme-court-is-political/ (quoting Yale Law Professor Akhil Amar, “If they decide this 
138 Texas Law Review [Vol. 91:121 
 
 
But there are two problems with this move.  First, it is unnecessary.  
Constitutional arguments with respect to the application of forward-looking 
provisions can have moral weight quite apart from the idea of redemption.  
Here are some constitutional arguments whose success or failure has 
determined the outcome of constitutional cases.  Women are not too timid 
and delicate to practice law.99  Interracial marriage is not against God’s 
plan.100  Same-sex relationships are not deviant expressions of mental 
illness.101  These are not part of the traditional modalities of arguing about 
meaning—they are not in Philip Bobbitt’s taxonomy.102  But they are 
constitutional arguments, and they are also the sort of claims that people are 
inspired to rally around or rally against.  The magic of the Constitution is that 
through delegations, through the possibility of constitutional politics, it can 
achieve its own transubstantiation.  It can make our moral discourse—it can 
make our everyday lives—into matters of constitutional significance.  (The 
last thing I tell my students is that the Constitution is their responsibility.)  
There is no need to add that pursuing such causes will redeem the promises 
of the Declaration. 
And will it?  The second problem with the idea of redemption is that it 
is not entirely persuasive.  The story Balkin tells in Constitutional 
Redemption describes the Declaration as fundamentally concerned with 
equality and American constitutional history as an attempt to fulfill that 
promise.  But this is not so clear.  Equality is the first great principle 
mentioned in the Declaration, of course, but to say that all men are created 
equal is to describe their starting point, the consequence of divine action.  As 
far as the responsibilities of human government go, the Declaration does not 
proclaim equality to be an inalienable right, and it does not state that 
government has any obligation to protect or promote it. 
Even if the Declaration were centrally concerned with equality, it is 
hard to make a case that this principle made it into the Founders’ 
Constitution.103  The Founders’ Constitution does not explicitly require the 
 
by 5-4, then yes, it’s disheartening to me, because my life was a fraud.  Here I was, in my silly little 
office, thinking law mattered, and it really didn’t.  What mattered was politics, money, party, and 
party loyalty.”). 
99. Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 131 (1872). 
100. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 3–12 (1967). 
101. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578–79 (2003); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635–36 
(1996). 
102. PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 3–8 (1982). 
103. Pauline Maier and David Armitage have suggested that there is little evidence the 
Declaration had influence on the drafting of the Constitution.  PAULINE MAIER, AMERICAN 
SCRIPTURE: MAKING THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 165–67 (1997); DAVID ARMITAGE, 
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE: A GLOBAL HISTORY 92 (2007).  Given this lack of 
connection, the idea of redeeming the Declaration via the Constitution is a little odd.  The 
Declaration was never ratified by the American people, and using the Constitution to realize its 
values is only marginally more sensible than using the Constitution to redeem the French 
Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen or the United Nations’ Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights. 
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government to treat people equally, and even if we suppose that the Due 
Process Clause contained some equality principle,104 that clause bound the 
federal government and not the states.  The issue of states discriminating 
among their own citizens was not one to which the Founders’ Constitution 
gave much thought.  Consistent with the revolutionary paradigm, it saw the 
distant general government as the threat and the states as the natural 
protectors of liberty.105 
Balkin’s story about the role of the Declaration in American life relies 
on one main authority: Abraham Lincoln.106  Lincoln is a hugely important 
figure in American constitutional history, and his embrace of the Declaration 
matters.  In describing America as a nation “dedicated to the proposition that 
all men are created equal,”107 Lincoln sought to change our self-conception, 
to elevate equality above liberty as the fundamental American value.  He 
sought to locate this value in the past for the same reason that Balkin and 
other constitutional entrepreneurs do today: arguments are always more 
powerful when they call on us to redeem our commitments, to keep faith 
with the revered figures of our history.  And he chose the Declaration rather 
than the Constitution because the Founders’ Constitution is plainly more 
concerned with liberty.  The Declaration was all he had. 
The Gettysburg Address is a beautiful piece of rhetoric, and it is justly 
considered one of America’s constitutive documents.  All the same, I do not 
find Lincoln’s claim entirely persuasive on its own terms.  As far as the 
Declaration goes, the Southern secessionists had the more obvious claim to 
stand in the shoes of the signers.  They were the ones asserting the right to 
alter or amend a form of government they feared had become destructive of 
their rights.108  They were concerned in very large part about the right to own 
slaves, of course,109 but that simply reinforces the parallel.  The secession of 
 
104. It does now, of course.  See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954) (noting that 
serious “discrimination[s] may be so unjustifiable as to be violative of due process”).  And there is a 
plausible argument that the drafters and ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment understood “due 
process” to have a substantive egalitarian component.  The case is weaker for the Fifth Amendment, 
however.  Ryan C. Williams, The One and Only Substantive Due Process Clause, 120 YALE L.J. 
408, 454 (2010) (concluding that, based on a variety of historical evidence, the ratifiers of the Fifth 
Amendment had, at most, a limited conception of substantive due process). 
105. Kermit Roosevelt III, What if Slaughter-House Had Been Decided Differently, 45 IND. L. 
REV. 61, 65–66 (2011). 
106. Lincoln is not alone, of course.  For discussions of the Declaration’s role in American 
political and constitutional history, see generally SCOTT DOUGLAS GERBER, TO SECURE THESE 
RIGHTS: THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE AND CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (1995) 
and ALEXANDER TSESIS, FOR LIBERTY AND EQUALITY: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF THE 
DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (2012). 
107. Abraham Lincoln, Address Delivered at the Dedication of the Cemetery at Gettysburg, in 7 
COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 22–23 (Roy P. Bassler ed., 1953), available at 
http://quod.lib.umich.edu/l/lincoln/. 
108. JAMES M. MCPHERSON, BATTLE CRY OF FREEDOM: THE CIVIL WAR ERA 56–57 (1988). 
109. The Mississippi Secession Declaration, for instance, opens by stating: “Our position is 
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slaveholding states from a nation that had banned the practice is a description 
that fits the American Revolution as well as, if not better than, the Civil 
War.110  Indeed, the first American slaves who fled their masters to join an 
army that promised them freedom were not southern slaves heading North in 
the Civil War; they were colonial slaves joining the British.111  The 
Confederates certainly saw themselves as the true heirs of the signers.  The 
South Carolina Secession letter, for instance, repeatedly echoes the 
Declaration and places it above the Constitution, not because it champions 
equality but because it affirms the right of the people to alter or amend their 
form of government.112 
So I do not think that Lincoln was correct in identifying equality as the 
core American value in 1863.  But Lincoln was a constitutional entrepreneur, 
and much of the point of such claims is that they become correct if people 
accept them.  Lincoln’s claim did prevail.  Equality has taken its place in the 
pantheon of American values.  Is Balkin then right to invoke the Declaration, 
as Lincoln did? 
I don’t think so.  Lincoln’s claim remains unpersuasive with respect to 
the Declaration, the Founders’ Constitution, and pre-Civil War America.  
When his vision prevailed, it was through the force of Union steel and the 
strong-arm tactics of the Reconstruction Congress.  America, though not 
Lincoln himself, saw the new birth of freedom that he prophesied; we had 
Reconstruction and the Reconstruction Amendments.  That is where equality 
entered our higher law, and that is when. 
Of course, it was a promise initially unfulfilled.  Here Balkin’s account 
of redemption actually makes much more sense.  Why, one might ask, would 
a constitutional provision ever fail to achieve its full purpose?  The 
supermajority that enacts it surely has power to enforce its desires.  (This is 
why talk of aspirational provisions so often makes them into Trojan Horses: 
the “aspirations” tend to belong to a small subgroup.)  But not with the 
Reconstruction Amendments.  Those Amendments were forced on the 
defeated South by a Congress that knew it would soon be reseating Members 
 
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI FROM THE FEDERAL UNION para. 2 (1860), available at 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th century/csa_missec.asp. 
110. British courts consistently held that no master–slave relationship could exist in England; 
any slave who set foot in England became free.  E.g., Somerset v. Stewart, [1772] 98 Eng. Rep. 499 
(K.B.) 499–501.  The British banned the African slave trade in 1807 and emancipated existing 
slaves in 1833.  U. O. Umozurike, The African Slave Trade and the Attitudes of International Law 
Toward It, 16 HOW. L.J. 334, 339 (1971).  By contrast, among the Union states at the time of the 
Civil War, Delaware, Kentucky, Maryland, Missouri, and the newly created West Virginia all 
recognized slavery.  Mark A. Lause, Border States, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN CIVIL 
WAR: A POLITICAL, SOCIAL, AND MILITARY HISTORY 252, 252–54 (David S. Heidler & Jeanne T. 
Heidler eds., 2000). 
111. Henry J. Richardson III, The Black International Tradition and African American Business 
in Africa, 34 N.C. CENT. L. REV. 170, 175 (2012). 
112. DECLARATION OF IMMEDIATE CAUSES WHICH INDUCE AND JUSTIFY THE SECESSION OF 
SOUTH CAROLINA FROM THE FEDERAL UNION (1860), available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th 
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deeply opposed to Reconstruction.  Indeed, the Reconstruction Congress 
faced fierce opposition from the President and the Supreme Court, and the 
venture was largely abandoned with the Compromise of 1877.  With the 
Reconstruction Amendments, we do indeed have a situation where the 
framers of the amendments could not achieve their goals.  Redemption 
occurred through later constitutional construction, driven and assisted by 
social movements, in what C. Vann Woodward called the Second 
Reconstruction of the Warren Court.113 
So there is something doubly odd about Balkin’s appeal to the 
Declaration.  Not only does he choose a less than fully convincing object of 
devotion, but he ignores one that more obviously fits his purposes, a situation 
where the value he champions—equality—did enter our Constitution, only to 
be rebuffed.  Lincoln had no choice, no text other than the Declaration, but 
Balkin does.  The Constitution has changed since the Founders’ days, not 
through construction but through amendment.  There are words about 
equality; there was a war about it, and we won. 
Or did we?  There’s the rub.  Who won the Civil War?  Ask an 
American who won the Revolution, or World War II, and the answer is clear: 
we did, we the Americans, we the United States.  But ask about the Civil 
War, and the answer will usually be “the North,” with a “we” only if the 
respondent hails from above the Mason–Dixon line.  The Civil War remains 
intensely divisive, as does Reconstruction.  The project of keeping faith with 
the Founders appeals to everyone; keeping faith with the Reconstruction 
Congress does not.  That is why our civic religion of the Constitution is so 
Founding centered, and that is why Balkin looks back to the Declaration: to 
find consensus. 
Consensus is nice, of course, and if we believe that the value of equality 
can be found there, it may be possible, to some extent, to use the Declaration 
as a placeholder or euphemism for Reconstruction.  But there are also real 
costs to trying to maintain continuity with the Founding.114  For while Balkin 
engages in his heroic reconceptualization of the Declaration (it reminds me 
of Michael McConnell’s struggle to make the classic originalist case for 
Brown115), other people appeal to the Founding for other purposes. 
One way to understand American constitutional history is as a constant 
struggle between the values of the Founding and the values of 
Reconstruction.  The Founding, put broadly, stands for individual liberty, for 
 
113. For the first use of the term “Second Reconstruction,” see C. Vann Woodward, The 
Political Legacy of Reconstruction, 26 J. NEGRO EDUC. 231, 240 (1957).  For further explication of 
the concept of the Second Reconstruction, see RICHARD M. VALELLY, THE TWO 
RECONSTRUCTIONS: THE STRUGGLE FOR BLACK ENFRANCHISEMENT 149–98 (2004) and 
WOODWARD, supra note 90, at 6–10, 122–47. 
114. See Aziz Rana, Freedom Struggles and the Limits of Constitutional Continuity, 71 MD. L. 
REV. 1015, 1019 (2012) (arguing that “the American failure to similarly embrace rupture and to 
break from constitutional faith played a critical role in sustaining practices of subordination”). 
115. McConnell, supra note 90, at 953. 
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limited federal power, for the ability of states to run their internal affairs as 
they see fit.116  Reconstruction stands for equality, for broader federal 
authority, for federal rights and federal laws protecting individuals from their 
own states.  The contest between the nation and the states erupts with the 
Civil War, and the Reconstruction vision enters our Constitution afterwards.  
But it is quite quickly pushed back by the Redeemers and the Klan.117  The 
Second Reconstruction of the Warren Court restores the values of 
Reconstruction, but it too meets opposition.  In part, this opposition focuses 
on specific doctrines: affirmative action, school desegregation, voting 
rights.118  But in part it takes the form of a more comprehensive theoretical 
attempt to delegitimize the decisions of the Second Reconstruction.  It takes 
the form of classic originalism, which seeks to elevate the Founding above 
Reconstruction.  Classic originalism is the legal theory of the Second 
Redemption.119 
Balkin takes this theory on, and I think he demonstrates quite plainly 
that it is mistaken: some constitutional provisions may be designed to have 
applications that change over time.  But there is another problem with the 
attempt to decide cases based on Founding-era values, to which he gives less 
attention.  We like to think that our constitutional history is a success story, 
that the wisdom of our Founders has served us well for over two hundred 
years.  But the truth is that the Founders’ Constitution was a failure.  It lasted 
seventy years and then came apart in what we must hope is the costliest war 
America will ever suffer.  If the Constitution had any goal, it was to avert 
that war, to prevent the mass slaughter of Americans by Americans.  (Three-
quarters of a million dead120—how’s that for “domestic Tranquility” and the 
“blessings of Liberty”?)  To talk about the success of our Constitution 
without considering the Civil War brings to mind the old joke: apart from 
that, Mrs. Lincoln, how did you like the play? 
Balkin tends to glide over the discontinuity.  His attempt to avoid this 
unpleasantness is laudable in some ways.  But by looking back to the 
 
116. At least, this is the Founding as compared to Reconstruction.  Compared to the Articles of 
Confederation, the Founding Constitution stands for strong national power.  The tension between 
the nation and the states goes back to the very beginning; it is there in the Declaration itself, in the 
question whether the Declaration produced fully independent states or whether it called into being a 
single American nation, as Lincoln argued.  (The Gettysburg Address dates the founding of the 
nation to 1776, not 1789.)  I think it is telling that the Declaration’s final paragraph talks of “united 
States” rather than the “United States” of the Constitution. 
117. For background information on The Redeemers, see C. VANN WOODWARD, ORIGINS OF 
THE NEW SOUTH 1877–1913, at 1–22 (1951). 
118. For a discussion of the Second Redemption, see, for example, Jamie B. Raskin, 
Affirmative Action and Racial Reaction, 38 HOW. L.J. 521 (1995). 
119. Except, ironically, in the area of affirmative action, where the conservative Justices seem 
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said “No state shall engage in racial classification.” 
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Declaration, he accepts the legitimacy of Founding-centered 
constitutionalism, which has significant costs.  It suggests that the Founding 
provides the appropriate lens through which to view issues of federal–state 
relations, which is simply not the case.  When we talk about the federal–state 
balance, we should be thinking not about Philadelphia but Gettysburg, not 
about the Federalist Papers but the Reconstruction Amendments.  Yet the 
Supreme Court persistently appeals to the Founding in its attempts to draw 
federal–state boundaries, most recently in the Patient Protection Affordable 
Care Act decision, where Chief Justice Roberts wrote movingly about the 
nation our Framers dreamed of.121  Balkin rejects classic originalism, but by 
looking back to the Declaration he accedes to the decisive move in the 
conjuring trick of the Second Redemption: the suggestion that we still live 
under the Founders’ Constitution. 
Conclusion 
Balkin’s theoretical analysis is spot on and devastating to classic 
originalism.  It may finally drive a stake through the heart of that doctrine.  
Or it may not.  But if it does, is the next step to redeem the Declaration?  I 
am not so sure.  Balkin’s story about the Declaration is beautiful and 
inspiring, and if we all wanted to take the same principles from the Founding 
era, it might give us a way to go forward together.  But not everyone wants 
what he wants, and I can tell a different story about America.  Here it is: 
America was born in sin, conceived from a deal with the Devil.  
Maintaining slavery was the price of independence and of union, for neither 
could have been achieved without the support of the slaveholding states.  
Though many Founders opposed slavery personally, they accepted it.  They 
elided it in the Declaration; they protected it in the Constitution.  And they 
brought forth a new nation. 
But the Devil will have his due.  America paid; she paid with her 
children.  For her posterity, the Founders’ Constitution brought not the 
blessings of liberty, but the curse of war. 
Lincoln knew this.  He elevated the Declaration because he knew that 
the Founders’ Constitution was a “covenant with death” and “an agreement 
with Hell.”122  He knew that the Civil War was a judgment upon us, that 
“every drop of blood drawn with the lash, shall be paid by another drawn 
 
121. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, No. 11-393, slip op. at 3–4 (June 28, 2012).  Justice 
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fundamentally after the Civil War”). 
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with the sword.”123  America paid the heaviest price she has ever suffered.  
And then she rebuilt herself.  From the ruin of the first sin, she was born 
again.  The Reconstruction Amendments turned the Founders’ Constitution 
inside out and upside down.  The federal government interposed itself 
between the states and their citizens; the nation committed to protecting her 
people.  Reconstruction redeemed America and gave us a Constitution 
worthy of our faith. 
But then we struck another bargain.  The Compromise of 1877, the end 
of Reconstruction, the redemption of the South: we purchased national 
reconciliation at the cost of racial justice.  We healed the wounds of the Civil 
War on the backs of the freedmen. 
Almost a hundred years later, a Second Reconstruction came to restore 
the promise of the first.  And as night follows day, there came a Second 
Redemption as well, a new generation to raise the old banner.  The party of 
Lincoln adopted the Southern Strategy.  Ronald Reagan launched his 1980 
campaign by praising states’ rights before a crowd in Philadelphia, 
Mississippi, where civil rights workers were murdered sixteen years 
before.124  When he won, his Justice Department adopted a strategy of 
constitutional interpretation designed to undermine the decisions of the 
Second Reconstruction. 
Time and again we have done this.  American history repeats the 
bargain over and over, diminuendo; the first fall echoes down the years, 
growing fainter but never entirely still.  The struggle continues, and each 
generation must decide anew which version of America will prevail: the 
Founding or Reconstruction, liberty or equality, the nation or the states. 
Like Balkin’s, this is just a story.  Like Balkin’s, it leaves some things 
out and emphasizes others.  But I think it has some truth too.  The difference 
is that it is less conciliatory.  Balkin tries to avoid the tension between 
Reconstruction and the Founding by locating the values of Reconstruction in 
the Declaration, which allows him to say that America has always struggled 
to realize the value of equality.  My story is less about the struggle of 
America, in which all can participate, and more about the struggle for 
America, in which we must choose sides.  It identifies villains, which 
Balkin’s generally does not. 
Maybe Balkin’s story is more effective; maybe it is all our fallen time 
can accept.125  But we should remember that in the past we purchased 
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reconciliation at the price of justice.  We should remember that Chief Justice 
Warren wrote an opinion in Brown that was “above all, non-accusatory,”126 
and that is why, half a century later, a different Chief Justice could claim that 
Brown prohibited state attempts to avoid de facto segregation, that it 
identified simple racial integration as a forbidden state purpose.127  The ghost 
will not rest, the past will not be past, until we can call it by its proper name.  
Until we can all say that we won the Civil War.  We the People of the United 
States. 
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127. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 726 (2007) 
(describing “racial balance” as “an objective this Court has repeatedly condemned as illegitimate”); 
id. at 746–47 (describing the school district’s use of racial classifications to eliminate de facto 
segregation as “once again” telling schoolchildren “where they could and could not go to school 
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